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Human rights obligations to the poor
MONICA HAKIMI*

Poverty unquestionably detracts from the human rights mission. Modern
human rights law recognizes a broad range of rights - for example, "to
life, liberty, and security of person" and to adequate "food, clothing,
and medical care." 1 Any number of those rights might go unrealized in
conditions of extreme poverty. However, human rights law has always
been partly aspirational. For those seeking to improve the lives of the
poor, the key question is not what rights exist but how to make those
rights operational. What does human rights law actually require of states?
And how might its obligations benefit the poor?

28.1 Human rights obligations
Human rights instruments typically assign states obligations separately
from recognizing rights. Many treaties - including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) - define
state obligations amorphously. Under the ICCPR, states must "respect
and ... ensure" rights. 2 The I CESCR generally requires states to "take
steps" toward realizing rights. 3
In his influential book, Basic Rights, Henry Shue argued for further
specifying human rights obligations. 4 Shue contested the view, then
* This chapter is a condensed and slightly modified version of M. Hakimi, "State Bystander

Responsibility," Eur. J. Int'/ L., 21(2010),341.
1 GA Res. 217A, UN GAOR, 3rd Sess., 1st plen. mtg., UN Doc. A/180, Arts. 3, 25 (December
12, 1948); see also ICCPR, GA Res. 2200A, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., UN Doc. A/RES/2200
(December 16, 1966) (entered into force March 23, 1976); ICESCR, GA Res. 2200A, UN
GAOR, 21st Sess., UN Doc. A/6316 (December 16, 1966) (entered into force January 3,
1976).
2 ICCPR, Art. 2( I).
3 ICESCR, Art. 2(1).
4 H. Shue, Basic Rights, 2nd edn. (Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 52.
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dominant in the human rights literature, that every right grounds a single,
correlative obligation. He argued that the same ICCPR or ICESCR right
might ground multiple obligations. And he identified three: obligations to
respect, protect, and fulfill. 5 Obligations to respect are paradigmatic obligations not to violate rights. They are well established in human rights
law. Obligations to protect require states to restrain third parties from
violating rights. Obligations to fulfill assume no particular abuser; they
require states to foster positive instead of negative liberties.
Shue's typology helped inform the human rights treaties. Consider the
ICCPR right to life. 6 That right unquestionably grounds an obligation not
to kill people arbitrarily (obligation to respect). Shue demonstrated that,
based on the same right, states might have to restrain third parties from
killing (obligation to protect). States might even have to give people access
to emergency medical care (obligation to fulfill). 7 Similarly, the ICESCR
right to food had been understood to require states to try to make food
more widely available (obligation to fulfill). 8 Shue suggested that states
might have to refrain from forcibly depriving people of food (obligation
to respect) and prevent third parties from doing the same (obligation to
protect). Of course, Shue's obligations could easily be rephrased as new
rights. The obligation to respect the right to food might be rephrased as
the right not to be forcibly deprived of food by the state. But the right
to food had already been conceptualized and codified in more general
terms. Shue was influential because he presented a vision for developing human rights law consistently with its own conceptual and textual
foundations.

28.2 Obligations to protect
Obligations to protect have new energy in international law, because various actors now underscore that state sovereignty - historically a shield

5 Shue, Basic Rights. Shue refers to these obligations as obligations to avoid, protect, and
aid. The respect, protect, and fulfill language is conceptually the same and dominates the
human rights literature.
6 ICCPR, Art. 6.
7 Cf. Samity v. State of W B. (1996) 4 SCC 36 (India) (finding that right to life grounds
obligation to provide emergency medical care).
8 ICESCR, Art. 11.
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from human rights criticism- is instead a justification for requiring states
to protect people from third-party harm. 9 The idea is neither novel nor
radical. Political theorists have long cited obligations to protect to justify
the state's very existence. 10 States exist, at least in part, to protect their
populations from harm and to enforce the law against those who might
intrude on individual liberties. In human rights law, decision-makers now
claim, prescribe, and apply such obligations in a broad range of contexts.
For example, several human rights treaties obligate states to protect people from abuses committed by private actors. 11 States acknowledge that
they have such obligations, 12 and courts and treaty bodies enforce and
apply them. 13 In the Genocide Case, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) determined that states must protect against acts of genocide committed by or in another state. 14 And many actors now endorse a concept
that they term the "Responsibility to Protect." 15 The concept posits that:
(i) each state must protect its own population from war crimes and mass

9 See, e.g. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect" (2001), p. 13, www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp; High-Level Panel on Threats,
Challenges & Changes, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," UN Doc.
A/59/565 (2004), paras. 29-30; see also M. Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure,"
Dissent, 49 (2002), 114, 119: "State sovereignty, instead of being the enemy of human
rights, has to be seen as their basic precondition."
10 For an overview, see S. J. Heyman, "The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty
and the Fourteenth Amendment," Duke L. f., 41 (1991), 507.
11 See, e.g. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Art. 2(e), GA Res. 34/180, UN GAOR Supp., 46th Sess., UN Doc. A/34/180 (December
18, 1979) (entered into force September 3, 1981) (hereinafter, CEDAW); and Convention
on the Rights of the Child, Art. 19(1), GA Res. 44/25, Annex, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., UN
Doc. A/44/49 (November 20, 1989) (entered into force September 2, 1990).
12 See, e.g. Albfm-Cornejo v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 171 (November 22, 2007), para. ll; and Human Rights Committee
(HRC), "Initial Report: Honduras," UN Doc. CCPR/C/HND/2005/l (April 26, 2005),
paras. 45-53.
13 See, e.g. Report of the HRC, "Concluding Observations: Mali," UN Doc. A/58/40 (Vol.
I) (2003), at 47, para. 81(16); Report of the CESCR, 25th Sess., April23-May 11,2001,
"Concluding Observations: Togo," UN Doc. E/2002/22, at 57, paras. 316, 322-3; and
Edwards v. United Kingdom, App. No. 46477/99, para. 56, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2002).
14 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 ICJ 1, paras. 429-30
(February 26) (hereinafter, Genocide Case).
15 See, e.g. SC Res. 1674, para. 4, UN Doc. S/RES/1674 (April28, 2006); 2005 World Summit
Outcome, GA Res. 60/l, para. 138, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (September 16, 2005); and UN
Secretary-General, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect," paras. 8-9, UN Doc.
A/63/677 (January 12, 2009).
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atrocities; and (ii) if one state fails, that obligation shifts to the international community as a whole.
Although that practice is extensive, it also is disjointed. Decisionmakers prescribe and apply the obligation ad hoc and for discrete contexts
at a time. 16 Not surprisingly, then, their decisions are at times misguided,
inconsistent, and even conceptually confused. 17 In other work, I presented a generalized framework on "state bystander responsibility" when states are and should be responsible for failing to satisfy obligations
to protect. 18 The framework is partly interpretive and partly normative.
It is interpretive in that it explains most of the existing practice. Surveying the practice across different contexts and legal sources, it extracts
the common principles that animate obligations to protect. Because the
practice is splintered, however, the framework also constructs a vision of
where the practice should go. In short, it seeks to nudge the practice in
a particular direction, as indicated by the dominant trends. I outline my
framework below.
28.2.1 Relationship with the abuser
The interest in protecting people from harm motivates human rights law
but does not (by itself) define the obligation to protect. First, that interest does not identify which state must act in any particular case. Unless
all states must protect against all third-party harms, something more is
needed- some additional nexus - to justify assigning the obligation to a
particular state. Second, the interest in restraining abusive third parties is
inevitably in tension with desired limits on the state's restraints. Some such
limits appear in human rights law itself. If a state suspects that someone is
planning a killing spree, the interest in protecting potential victims favors
requiring the state to restrain the suspect. But the interest in protecting the suspect (from undue state intrusion) justifies limiting the state's
restraints. 19 Analogous considerations appear elsewhere in international
law. For example, international legal norms discourage states from unilaterally influencing intergovernmental organizations (lOs) outside the
16
17
18
19

Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 349-50.
Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 350-4 and nn. 113-17, 127-30, 257-61.
Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 354-76.
Cf. Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, para. 116, Eur. Ct. H. R. (1998)
(hereinafter, Osman) (asserting that the obligation must be defined "in a manner which
fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on
the scope of [police] action").
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lOs' ordinary decision-making processes. 20 Those norms circumscribe
when and how states should restrain abusive lOs. Obligations to protect
must manage those tensions. They require a normative judgment that,
given the state's particular relationship with the abuser, its restraints are
desirable and not overly intrusive.
That determination will sometimes be difficult or indeterminate. But
for many common relationships in the international legal order, the practice offers substantial guidance. Paradigmatically, obligations to protect
require a state to restrain private abusers in its territory. 21 The dominant explanation for why is textual. 22 Many human rights treaties bind
a state only in its own territory or jurisdiction. 23 If those treaties establish obligations to protect, then (the reasoning goes) those obligations
are essentially territorial. That account is insufficient. First, it does not
explain why human rights treaties codify territorial or jurisdictional limitations in the first place. Second, it does not identify when states have
jurisdiction- and therefore obligations to protect- outside their national
territories. Third, it does not explain why obligations to protect are primarily territorial, even when the treaties establishing them lack explicit
territorial or jurisdictionallimits.24 Obligations to protect are primarily
territorial because statehood defines the relevant relationships in an area
and justifies requiring states to satisfy certain minimum standards. A state
must keep its house in order- in Max Huber's words, "display therein the
activities of a state." 25
States host in their territories not only private actors, but also other
states and lOs. The practice on whether states must restrain those actors
is relatively sparse. In one notable opinion, the Venice Commission of
the Council of Europe addressed the question of whether European states
had to protect against abuses committed during the CIA's detention and
20 See A. S. Muller, International Organizations and Their Host States (The Hague/
London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 149 (asserting that a "very important goal" of the rules on lOs is "to ensure the independence of the organization from
any interference by any individual state").
21 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 360-1 (discussing practice).
22 See M. Milanovic, "From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State
'Jurisdiction' in Human Rights Treaties," Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 8 (2008), 411, 412: "(T]he
scope of extraterritorial application of [human rights] treaties ultimately hinges" on "the
notion of'jurisdiction"' in the tre~ty texts.
23 See, e.g. ICCPR, Art. 2( 1).
24 See, e.g. ICESCR (no explicit jurisdictional limitation); and CEDAW (same).
25 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. US), 2 RIAA 829, 854-5 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (Huber, sole
arb.).
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rendition program. 26 The Venice Commission concluded that each European state had to protect against abuses in its airspace or territory. The
commission supported that conclusion by citing the well-established rule
that states must protect against private abuses in their territories. The
commission then reasoned, "[t]his is even more true in respect of agents
of foreign states." 27
That reasoning is only partially correct. The commission rightly determined that a state must restrain third parties, including other states, in
its territory. However, a state's obligations should be weaker against other
states than against private actors. Varied legal norms limit when and how
host states influence other states. 28 Such norms are intended to foster
cooperation and friendly relations among states and to preserve their
legal equality. The Venice Commission implicitly accommodated those
norms. It did not direct European states to invoke their expansive domestic authorities against the United States, as it almost certainly would have
done if the United States were a private actor. Instead, the commission
directed European states to try to restrain the CIA while managing other
treaty commitments and the rules on immunity. 29
By contrast, states generally need not restrain third parties in other
states. If anything, international law discourages states from unilaterally exercising governmental authority - and thereby restraining third
parties- outside their territories. 30 That norm against extraterritoriality
carries less weight when a population suffers serious harm. In such cases,
a state might have the right to restrain external abusers. 31 But any right

26 Venice Commission, Opinion No. 363/2005 on the International Legal Obligations of
Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-state
Transport of Prisoners, Doc. CDL-AD(2006)009 (2006) (hereinafter, Venice Commission
Opinion).
27 Venice Commission Opinion, para. 126.
28 See, e.g. S. Murphy, Principles ofInternational Law (St. Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2006),
pp. 259-67 (discussing rules on immunity); and G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw
States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 26-9 (discussing legal equality
of states).
29 Venice Commission Opinion, paras. 157-9.
30 See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
GA Res. 2625, Annex, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, UN Doc. A/8028, at 122
(October 24, 1970) (endorsing principle of non-interference); and R. Jennings and A.
Watts, Oppenheim's International Law, 9th edn. (London and Harlow: Longman, 1992),
pp. 382-90 (discussing state independence and territorial authority).
31 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Sp.),Judgment, 1970 ICJ 3, paras.
33-4 (February 5) (identifying erga omnes obligations as those owed to all states); see
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has not developed into an operative legal obligation. Decision-makers
sometimes claim that it has. For example, the claim of the Responsibility
to Protect is that all states must protect against especially severe abuses no
matter where they occur. 32 Although the claim is directed at all states, it
is essentially unenforceable and in practice unenforced against particular
bystander states. 33 It does not reflect an operative obligation to protect.
Nevertheless, the general rule against extraterritorial obligations to
protect has certain exceptions. For example, a state typically has such
obligations if it exercises complete control over foreign territory. 34 The
logic is similar to that which applies in a state's own territory. 35 The state
should maintain order in the area and avoid a vacuum of governance
authority. Thus, in the Armed Activities Case, Uganda had to protect
people in occupied Congo because Uganda alone exercised governmental
authority there. 36 The logic differs when a state has some territorial

32
33

34

35

36

generally C. J, Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge
University Press, 2005) (concluding that states may take countermeasures for severe erga
omnesviolations in other states).
See, e.g. n. 15 above and accompanying text; SC Res. 681, para. 5, UN Doc. S/RES/681
(December 20, 1990) (war crimes); and Genocide Case, paras. 429-30 (genocide).
See, e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross, "Improving Compliance with
International Humanitarian Law: ICRC Expert Seminars" (October 2003), p. 5,
www.icrc.org/eng/ assets/files/ other/improving_compliance_with...ihl- oct-.2003 .pdf (asking how to translate the claim on war crimes into "state practices and policies"); Institut de Droit International, lOth Commission, "Present Problems of the Use of Force
in International Law" (September 21, 2007) (prepared by W. M. Reisman), p. 176,
www.idi- iil.org/idiF/annuaireF/ 1Oth_comJeger _b.pdf (concluding that "responsibility"
in responsibility to protect is "not a 'duty' to act"); see also D. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 98: "[A]n undistributed
duty ... to which everybody is subject is likely to be discharged by nobody unless it can
be allocated in some way."
See, e.g. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 ICJ 168, paras. 172-80 (December 19) (hereinafter, Armed Activities);
Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/34, paras. 76--7, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2001) (hereinafter,
Cyprus); and Report of the CESCR, 19th Sess., November 16-December 4, 1998, "Concluding Observations: Israel," UN Doc. E/1999/22, paras. 232, 234 (1999).
See, e.g. Cyprus, para. 78 (justifying Turkish obligations in Cyprus partly on the ground
that "any other finding would result in a regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights
protection"); and Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ 16, para. 118 (June 21): "Physical control of a territory ... is
the basis of State liability for acts affecting other States."
Armed Activities, paras. 172-80; see also D. Fleck, The Handbook ofInternational Humanitarian Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 280: "The occupying power must
also take all measures to protect the inhabitants of occupied territories from violence by
third parties."
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control but lacks complete authority to govern. In such cases, the state
might be discouraged from exercising the kind of authority necessary to
restrain abusers. In Cyprus v. Turkey, Turkey exercised some territorial
control in Northern Cyprus, but the Turkish Cypriots exercised most
administrative authority. 37 Restraining private abusers in Northern
Cyprus would have required Turkey to expand its authority- a move
that would have undermined the broader interest in an independent and
unified Cyprus. In the end, Turkey did not have to restrain private actors
in the area; that job properly fell to the Turkish Cypriots. 38
In addition, several important decisions extend the obligation extraterritorially when a state substantially enables an external actor to violate
rights but does not establish appropriate restraints. In the Genocide Case,
the ICJ determined that Serbia had not participated in the genocidal conduct of the Bosnian Serbs, but Serbia had failed to satisfy an obligation to
protect. 39 Serbia supported the Bosnian Serbs politically and militarily,
and it helped to oversee and direct them. 40 Having placed the Bosnian
Serbs in a position to violate rights, Serbia could not lawfully stand by
in the face of their violations. 41 Analogous considerations inform both
Cyprus and Ila?CU v. Moldova and Russia. 42 In each case, the defendant
state propped up and provided immense support to an abusive external
actor. Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriot administration, 43 and Russia did the same for separatists in Moldova. 44 The claimants could not
demonstrate that, since ratifying the European Convention on Human
Rights, those states participated in the abuse. Nevertheless, the European
Court of Human Rights held them responsible. The court's reasoning on
why they were responsible is unclear, 45 but the best answer is that they
failed to satisfy their obligations to protect.
Those cases make good sense. A state that substantially supports an
external actor has already involved itself in another state's affairs. The
normative considerations that usually discourage states from unilaterally
37 Cyprus.
38 Cyprus, paras. 80-1, 272, 347-8, 376. The Cyprus court is unclear on why Turkey's
obligations flowed from the abuses committed by the Turkish Cypriot administration
but not from the abuses committed by private actors. See Hakimi, "State Bystander
Responsibility," pp. 353-4, 377-8.
39 Genocide Case, paras. 386, 438.
40 Genocide Case, paras. 422, 434-8.
41 For more analysis, see Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 364-5.
42 Ila~cu v. Moldova and Russia, App. No. 48787/99, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2004) (hereinafter,
Ila~cu).

43 Cyprus, paras. 76-7.
44 Ila~cu, para. 392.
45 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 353, 365-6.
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restraining external actors- the interests of non-interference and fostering
friendly relations among states- either are less pronounced or have already
been compromised. They are outweighed by the interest in protecting
human life. Moreover, the enabling state's contribution warrants assigning
the obligation to that state, even though not to all others.

28.2.2 Severity of harm
Whether a state has the obligation also depends on the kind of harm at
issue. States must protect only against conduct that: (i) causes serious
physical or psychological harm; or (ii) affects people because they belong
to a vulnerable group. Conduct in the first category usually intrudes on
physical security. Torture, rape, slavery, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and other cruel or inhuman treatment all trigger obligations
to protect. Conduct in the second category typically discriminates on the
basis of a protected status -for example, because the person is a woman,
child, racial minority, or person with a disability. Such conduct is harmful because it reinforces existing inequalities or undermines the victim's
capacity to participate fully in public life. 46
Limiting the obligation to those two categories of conduct resolves
apparent inconsistencies in the practice. Decision-makers sometimes
assert that states must protect against all harms, no matter how severe. 47
That claim does not reflect the practice as applied. Treaties that expressly
establish the obligation do so almost exclusively for conduct falling in the
above two categories. 48 The post-ratification practice follows the same
general pattern. 49
Readers may worry that this limitation exposes a lacuna in the human
rights regime. Certain conduct may intrude on rights without triggering
any obligation to protect. As a practical matter, the worry is most pronounced for economic and social rights. Although some conduct that
interferes with those rights triggers an obligation to protect, 50 most such
conduct does not. Human rights law partly addresses the lacuna with
46 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 367-9 (reviewing practice).
47 See, e.g. CESCR, General Comment 18, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/18, para. 24 (February 6,
2006); and HRC, General Comment 31, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.l3, para. 8
(May 26, 2004).
48 See, e.g. sources cited at n. 11 above.
49 See, e.g. sources cited at nn. 12-13 above.
50 See, e.g. CESCR, "Concluding Observations: Morocco," UN Doc. E/C.12/ 1/Add .55, paras.
30, 54 (December I, 2000) (urging state to protect people from contaminated foodstuffs
causing death or serious illness).
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obligations to fulfill. Obligations to fulfill require states to enable rights
holders, rather than to restrain abusers.
To understand how the two obligations intersect, consider the right
to work. Dismissing an employee interferes with her right to work, but
absent some discrimination or serious harm, it does not trigger an obligation to protect: the state need not restrain the employer from dismissing
the employee. 5 1 Nevertheless, the state might have to fulfill the right- for
example, by offering educational programs or trying to target the causes
of unemployment. Because the obligations to protect and fulfill are complementary, obligations to fulfill may render obligations to protect less
compelling. Protecting people from workplace dismissal is less critical
if they may easily transfer to new jobs. Moreover, some measures may
satisfy both obligations simultaneously. Regulations mandating parental
leave arguably protect women from workplace discrimination- conduct
that triggers an obligation to protect. The same regulations might fulfill
the right to work by enabling people to continue working after becoming
parents. The distinction between obligations to protect and fulfill remains
important, however, because the applicable obligation determines what
the state must do.

28.2.3 Reasonable measures

A state that has the obligation to protect- because of its relationship with
the abuser and the severity of the harm- must take reasonable measures
of restraint. 52 Such measures differ in kind (for example, criminal or
diplomatic sanction); in their intended immediate effect (for example, to
avert an imminent harm or establish a general deterrent); and in their

51 The CESCR asserts that the right to work grounds an obligation to protect, but the committee uses hopelessly vague language to define that obligation. CESCR, General Comment 18, paras. 25, 35. Its most concrete suggestions are that states must protect against
forced labor and must protect people who are especially vulnerable (paras. 25, 31 ). Those
suggestions are consistent with my approach. ILO Convention (No. 158), Concerning
Termination of Employment, adopted June 22, 1982, www.ilo.org/ ilolex/ cgi -lex/ convde.
pi?Cl58, establishes slightly broader protections against workplace dismissal. However,
that convention has been ratified by only thirty-four states, and its obligations are rarely
invoked by, or before, the ILO. See www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm.
52 My reasonableness standard is similar to the due diligence standard that appears in some
of the practice. On due diligence standards, see generally R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, "The Due
Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States," German Y.
B. Int'l L., 35 ( 1992), 9.
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target (for example, a particular abuser or a diffuse group of potential
abusers). However, in any particular scenario, only some measures will be
both available to the state and sufficient to satisfy its obligation to protect.
The reasonableness standard is context-specific, but several factors
inform the inquiry. First, reasonableness turns on both the state's relationship with the abuser and the severity of the harm. Those factors affect
not only whether a state has the obligation, but also what the obligation requires. Measures that are reasonable for one kind of relationship or
harm may be unreasonable for another. 53 Second, reasonableness depends
on the degree of discretion afforded to states in any particular context.
In some contexts, obligations to protect are well developed and specific.
For example, states might have to investigate criminally and, if possible,
prosecute the abuser. 54 In other contexts, states have more discretion to
define their own measures. 55 Third, reasonableness depends on the scope
of the problem. Case-specific measures may be necessary to avert even a
single harm, 56 but a widespread problem suggests the need for systemic
measures targeting the legal or behavioral patterns that contribute to
abuse. 57
Finally, reasonableness may depend on the state's capacity to restrain
the abuser. A state is not absolved of an obligation simply because it lacks
effective measures of restraint. The whole point of the obligation is to
require states to develop those measures. Most of the practice assumes
that states can develop such measures. And though states are disparately
capable, the practice is circumspect about differentiating the obligation
on that basis. 58 It should be less so. Defining reasonableness in part
based on capacity would enjoin all states to make concerted efforts to
restrain abusers, without requiring them to do that which they genuinely
cannot. Further, it would permit each state to focus on its primary areas of
concern- on abuses that are especially deep-seated or prevalent- instead
of stretching its (inevitably limited) resources too thin.
53 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," p. 373.
54 See, e.g. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, December
17, 1997,37 ILM 249 (1998).
55 See, e.g. CEDAW, Art. 2(e) (requiring "appropriate" measures).
56 See, e.g. Osman, para. ll6; and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, "Communication No. 5/2005: Goekce v. Austria," UN Doc.
CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005, para. 12.1.2 (August 6, 2007).
57 See, e.g. da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., Report No. 54/01,
OEA/Ser.L./V/11.111, doc. 20 rev. para. 61(4) (2000); and CRC, "Report of the Eighth
Session," UN Doc. CRC/C/38, para. 288 (February 20, 1995).
58 Hakimi, "State Bystander Responsibility," pp. 374-6 (reviewing practice).
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28.3 Concluding implications on the rights of the poor
That framework explains when states must protect the poor from thirdparty harm. First, a state usually must protect only its own poor. It need
not protect the poor in other states unless it has a special relationship with
the abuser. Second, a state must protect the poor from only some kinds of
harm. This limitation is not as narrow as it may appear. Some conduct that
triggers the obligation, like human trafficking, disproportionately affects
the poor. 59 Other conduct, like race-based discrimination, may correlate
highly with poverty. States must try to protect people - including poor
people- from that conduct. Precisely what the state must do depends on
the circumstances. But in all cases, states must make an affirmative effort
to restrain actual or prospective abusers.
Advocates for the poor may feel disheartened. The economic and social
rights that are most relevant to the alleviation of poverty paradigmatically trigger obligations to fulfill, not to protect. Obligations to fulfill
remain frustratingly soft, notwithstanding considerable effort to make
them operational. 60 The solution is to continue developing those obligations. I conclude, then, with an example that both illustrates the protectfulfill distinction and shows promise for the obligation to fulfill. In Port
Elizabeth Municipality v. Various Occupiers, the South African Constitutional Court forbade the state from removing squatters from private
land. 61 The decision's practical effect was to restrain private landowners from evicting squatters. Yet Port Elizabeth does not stand for the
proposition that the right to housing triggers an obligation to protect.
Rather, the case is about the obligation to fulfill. 62 The government might
have fulfilled the squatters' right to housing in all sorts of ways other
than by restraining private landowners. For example, the government
might have- and perhaps ideally would have- provided accommodation to people in need. Absent those alternatives, however, preventing

59 See B. Carr, "When Federal and State Systems Converge: Foreign National Human Traf-

ficking Victims within Juvenile and Family Courts," juvenile and Family Court journal, 63
(20 12), 77, 79: "Children who are vulnerable to trafficking often share common characteristics and circumstances including ... impoverished childhoods ... [and] homelessness."
60 For a recent discussion, see S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and
Positive Duties (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 77-90.
61 Port Elizabeth Municipalityv. Various Occupiers, 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (S. Afr.).
62 See Port Elizabeth, para. 56 (examining "the fulfilment of the rights of all to have access
to adequate housing").
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the eviction was the best option for fulfilling the right. 63 Port Elizabeth
gave the obligation to fulfill real bite.
63 Port Elizabeth, para. 58 ("The real question in this case is whether the Municipality has
considered seriously or at all the request of these occupiers that they be provided with
suitable alternative land ... "); and para. 61 (" [T]his decision in no way precludes further
efforts to find a solution to a situation that is manifestly unsatisfactory to all concerned.").

